IV

For the third kind of cases on the concept of intention, intention with which an action is done, Anscombe gets to “intended result.” For example, if I intend to get some fresh air – the intended result, I may take the action of going outside or opening the window. The action itself is not as important as the result which is the intention in the agent’s mind. Once the intended result is set, the agent then takes actions toward producing that result based on what’s available or what the agent is capable of or what the agent prefers to do. The intended result as intention is another way of getting at Anscombe’s classification of intentional action as an action to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given applications. In other words, the intended result as intention gets at Anscombe’s implication on the teleological structure of intentions. We tend to only intend for the end result either because the particular action to get to­­­ the result is not known at the time of intention or because the particular action is one of the many options available or that the particular action is contingent on other things being available. Not all intentional actions have intended results. Some are merely reactions, e.g., in the case of mental causes such as getting startled and knocking off the cup or shouting out of anger. We discuss a chain of multiple intended results and a web of intentions and actions in earlier parts of the essay, which illustrates the teleological structure of intentions and actions.

Anscombe discusses motives and reasons for actions, and motives as reasons. For example, when someone asks, ‘why did you kill him?’, the answer ‘because he killed my father’ is a motive and a reason but not a cause. A motive and a reason belong to the same category of things in that they are both directed at what Anscombe describes as intention with which an action is done. In the question and answer above, although ‘because he killed my father’ states a past event and not an intention, the intended result is implicit – ‘I want revenge’. Therefore, stating a reason or a motive for an action is to state the intended result. As I do not make a distinction between motives and intentions, I do not make a distinction between a motive and a reason. A motive and an intention are indistinguishable because both tend to the intended result, even though one may be in a closer proximity to the action in question. A reason is not necessarily an intended result and can include mental causes as described earlier, e.g., ‘why did you shut the door in such a panic?’ – ‘I saw a bear coming this way and was startled.’ This is a mental cause such that the action has no intended result, but it is a reaction to something due to external stimulation or internal perception. A reason can also be another way of stating the intended result, e.g., “What is the reason you called a taxi?” – “I want to go to my grandmother’s house.” Therefore, there are two types of reasons for intentional actions, namely, mental causes and intended results. In the sense of mental causes, reasons are causes while in the sense of intended result, reasons are motives and intentions.

Anscombe insists that motives are not causes. Here I would like to discuss causes. Aristotelian metaphysics provides for four causes of being: (i) the material cause - of what is it constituted? For example, the bowl is made from bronze. Bronze is the material cause; (ii) the efficient cause - what moves it? For example, the movement of my fingers causes the keys on the computer to move; (iii) the formal cause - what is it? For example, I am a human being; and (iv) the final cause - what is its purpose (telos)? Health, for example, is the purpose of exercising. It seems that we could at least borrow the idea of an efficient cause and a final cause from the Aristotelian framework and apply them to intentions. When an intention is expressed in terms of an intended result, they point to a purpose, e.g. “I am calling a taxi to go to my grandmother’s house.” Here, the intended result, or the intention, points to a purpose, and the intention of “going to my grandmother’s house” serves as a final cause of the action of calling a taxi. When an intention is a mental cause, it points to the intention being an efficient cause in the Aristotelian framework, e.g. “I was startled, and I knocked over the cup.” Or “I was so angry, and I started to shout.” When one talks about the cause of an action, as Davidson does in Actions, Reasons, and Causes, it instantly feels off because as complex as an action is, it is often the result of multiple inputs. Pinning down the cause seems unrealistic. To speak of the cause of an action is to ignore the nature of complexity in an action. It is still insufficient even with Davidson’s use of a pair of (a) the pro attitude or (b) the related belief or both. When one says: “the cause of B is A,” it points to the inevitability of B in the presence of A. Yet the presence of intention often do not make action inevitable. Free action is not inevitable. In contrast, saying that an intention is an efficient cause that moves the action or a final cause that provides a purpose recognizes the complexity and possible multiple inputs to an action. Perhaps the cause under Davidson, the primary reason, which comprises the pro attitude, the related belief or both, should be a formal cause for action, in that it is a cause that speaks to the constituency of the agent. One knows that an action can not take place unless the environment supports it. So perhaps the environment, comprising the objects and the structures in the world, is the material cause of action.

Davidson suggests that “whenever someone does something for a reason, therefore, he can be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude toward actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.” He argues, because the reason for an agent to do something is often a matter of naming the pro attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both, the pro attitude (a) and the related belief (b) are the primary reason why an agent performs an action. This claim feels rather counterintuitive. If one goes up to the top of a snowy mountain, being a good skier, she thinks that skiing down the mountain will be fun (pro attitude (a)), and she believes that she can ski very well (related belief (b)), so she performs the action of skiing down the mountain. Imagine another person who also thinks that skiing down the mountain will be fun and believes that he can ski very well, but because he is neither at the top of the mountain nor is he actually capable of skiing, he will not be able to perform the action of skiing down the mountain. Because, in addition to the agent’s intention, i.e. the pro attitude and the related belief, being at the top of the mountain and being skillful at skiing are also necessary causes of the action of skiing down the mountain, calling intention, i.e. the reason for action, the primary reason, as Davidson calls it, does not seem to match our experience or our intuition.

Therefore, I propose, mirroring the Aristotelian framework of causes for being, a framework of causes for action: (i) the material cause – what is the environment? I am calling a taxi to go to my grandmother’s house. I am able to call the taxi because there are taxis around where I am in New York city; (ii) the efficient cause – what moves it? I was startled, so I knocked over the cup; or I was angry, so I shouted; (iii) the formal cause – what are the pro attitudes and beliefs of the agent? I am kind, and I gave the homeless person all the money in my wallet; (iv) the final cause – what is the purpose of the action? I am calling the taxi to go to my grandmother’s house.