(1) Blame depends on the existence of a moral obligation as reason and the existence of a moral obligation does not explain why agents should comply with moral obligations.

In Freedom and Resentment, Strawson does not address the reasons for reactive attitudes such as blame. But it is important to examine the reasons for blame in order to validate Darwall’s arguments. We need not look too deep to recognize that a warranted blame not just merely connects to blame conceptually, a warranted blame rests on the establishment of a moral obligation. For example, I can justifiably blame you for not taking care of your infant child because I take it for granted that taking care of your infant child is a moral obligation for you, whether or not I heed the reasons of why you should take care of your infant child. One cannot justifiably blame until after a baseline of what the other ought to do, i.e. a moral obligation, has been established. In this regard, blame is distinctive from other attitudes such as belief or desire in that belief or desire does not require the establishment of a moral obligation.

Darwall is right that there is a conceptual connection between blame and moral obligation. But he fails to identify that blame depends on the existence of moral obligation as reason. Suppose a child is told that parents ought to look after their children, the child can justifiably blame a friend’s parents for failing to look after the friend, without understanding why parents ought to look after their children. On the other hand, so long as a moral obligation does not exist, even if reasons exist for a moral agent, an agent subject to a moral code of conduct, to act a certain way, the moral agent cannot be justifiably blamed for failing to act in that certain way. This is illustrated in the case of supererogation – going above and beyond one’s call of duty: it is not a moral obligation for a moral agent to risk his life to run into a burning building to rescue a group of children who desperately need help. Even though there are valid and strong reasons for the moral agent to risk his life, he cannot be justifiably blamed for failing to do so because doing so isn’t a moral obligation for him.

Even if there are other reasons for warranted blame that are not based on the existence of a moral obligation, the existence of the moral obligation will remain the raison d'etre – the reason for existence – for blame, because no one should be justifiably blamed for failing to do something that is not morally required of them. Therefore, the normative reason in blame that Darwall seeks to be the reason for agents to comply with a moral obligation is the existence of the moral obligation. Thus, Darwall’s argument that moral obligation is connected to warranted blame, and that there is a normative reason for warranted blame, therefore complying with moral obligation has a normative reason turns out to be a circular argument: the reason for complying with a moral obligation is the existence of the moral obligation.