I. Introduction

In Self-Knowledge and Resentment, ¹ Bilgrami points out that self-knowledge is unique when embedded in a much wider framework integrating large themes of philosophy and not when it is in a narrow epistemological theme. He is correct that when self-knowledge is embedded in a wider framework, it integrates with the notions of value, agency, intentionality, and morality in general. Of these notions, a moral agent’s self-knowledge is a variable that may change over time. Thus, a question arises: assuming a moral agent may increase his self-knowledge, how does the growth of self-knowledge allow the moral agent to act more morally, if at all? And a related question: what kind of self-knowledge has the effect of allowing a moral agent to act more morally?

The empirical world has presented us with numerous examples of learned men and women committing immoral acts and uneducated ones performing admirable deeds of moral worth. Such examples suggest a lack of a necessary relation between knowledge in general and a moral agent’s tendency to act morally. Many philosophers also argue a lack of connection between knowledge and morality by denying that one can be taught to act more morally. But self-knowledge is unique in the wider framework of ethics and is not merely knowledge. Even though some philosophers suggest that a moral agent’s moral tendency can never change, ² empirical evidence denies such a conclusion. We observe that a moral agent may exhibit different moral tendencies toward different people or their moral tendency can change over time. Some moral agents even commit to change their moral tendencies. For example, with loving kindness being an aim, sages and Buddhists shut themselves off from the world to self-reflect and meditate to achieve a higher state of enlightenment and, potentially, to have a higher level of morality. Suppose a moral agent’s moral tendency can change, and the moral agent’s self-knowledge can also change. In that case, it is possible that the change of self-knowledge is the impetus for the change of the agent’s morality.

This essay explores the two questions raised at the beginning regarding whether self-knowledge may affect morality and what kind of self-knowledge may have such an effect.