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diff --git a/test/reference/abstraction/the_public_domain.james_boyle.en.ssp b/test/reference/abstraction/the_public_domain.james_boyle.en.ssp index 47fc71d..675fb34 100644 --- a/test/reference/abstraction/the_public_domain.james_boyle.en.ssp +++ b/test/reference/abstraction/the_public_domain.james_boyle.en.ssp @@ -2043,11 +2043,11 @@ .ancestors_collapsed: 1 86 103 0 0 0 0 0 .parent_lev: 5 .is_of_type: para -.sha256: A127FE6537C864BCB227C370B6783FB6BA4C71CAA47CB57C06EA7C36F93BA00C +.sha256: 655C26DB6668FFD6D258C516023775AD03EC2AA44714E8B0CB1A8071399BFD67 .has: links notes_reg .segment_html_is: chapter_2 .segment_epub_is: chapter_2 -| These words from Jefferson and Macaulay encapsulate an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century free-trade skepticism about intellectual property, a skepticism that is widely, but not universally, believed to have played an important role in shaping the history of intellectual property in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Certainly the U.S. Supreme Court has offered support for that position,【43 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1966).】 and, with one significant recent exception,【44 Adam Mossoff, “Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? Reevaluating the Patent ‘Privilege’ in Historical Context,” Cornell Law Review 92 (2007): 953–1012. In a thoughtful, carefully reasoned, and provocative article, Professor Mossoff argues that Jefferson’s views have been misused by the courts and legal historians, and that if we understand the use of the word “privilege” in historical context, we see that the “patent privilege” was influenced by a philosophy of natural rights as well as the antimonopolist utilitarianism described here. I both agree and disagree.┙ Professor Mossoff’s central point—that the word “privilege” was not understood by eighteenth-century audiences as the antonym of “right”—is surely correct. To lay great stress on the linguistic point that the patent right is “merely” a “privilege” is to rest one’s argument on a weak reed. But this is not the only argument. One could also believe that intellectual property rights have vital conceptual and practical differences with property rights over tangible objects or land, that the framers of the Constitution who were most involved in the intellectual property clause were deeply opposed to the confusion involved in conflating the two, and that they looked upon this confusion particularly harshly because of an intense concern about state monopolies. One can still disagree with this assessment, of course; one can interpret Madison’s words this way or that, or interpret subsequent patent decisions as deep statements of principle or commonplace rhetorical flourishes. Still it seems to me a much stronger argument than the one based on the privilege–right distinction. I am not sure Professor Mossoff would disagree. \\ Professor Mossoff is also correct to point out that a “legal privilege” did sometimes mean to an eighteenth-century reader something that the state was duty-bound to grant. There was, in fact, a wide range of sources from which an eighteenth-century lawyer could derive a state obligation to grant a privilege. Eighteenth-century legal talk was a normative bouillabaisse—a rich stew of natural right, common law, utility, and progress—often thrown together without regard to their differences. Some lawyers and judges thought the common law embodied natural rights, others that it represented the dictates of “progress” and “utility,” and others, more confusingly still, seemed to adopt all of those views at once. \\ Nevertheless, I would agree that some eighteenth-century writers saw claims of common-law right beneath the assertion of some “privileges” and that a smaller number of those assumed common-law right and natural right to be equivalent, and thus saw a strong state obligation to grant a particular privilege based on natural right, wherever that privilege had been recognized by English or U.S. common law. But here is where I part company with Professor Mossoff. \\ First, I do not believe that the most important architects of the intellectual property clause shared that view when it came to patents and copyrights. Jefferson, of course, was not one of those who believed the state was so bound. “Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body” (Letter to McPherson, 334, emphasis added). More importantly, Jefferson’s thinking about patents was infused by a deeply utilitarian, antimonopolist tinge. So, I would argue, was Madison’s. \\ The quotations from Madison which I give later show clearly, to me at least, that Madison shared Jefferson’s deeply utilitarian attitude toward patent and copyright law. I think there is very good reason to believe that this attitude was dominant among the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers whose writings were so influential to the framers. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the American Revolution was violently against the world of monopoly and corruption that was the supposed target of the English Statute of Monopolies (itself hardly a natural rights document). Yes, those thinkers might fall back into talking about how hard an inventor had worked or construing a patent expansively. Yes, they might think that within the boundaries of settled law, it would be unjust to deny one inventor a patent when the general scheme of patent law had already been laid down. But that did not and does not negate the antimonopolist and, for that matter, utilitarian roots of the Constitution’s intellectual property clause. \\ Second, while I agree that there were strands of natural right thinking and a labor theory of value in the U.S. intellectual property system, and that they continue to this day—indeed, these were the very views that the Feist decision discussed in Chapter 9 repudiated, as late as 1991—I think it is easy to make too much of that fact. Is this signal or noise? There are conceptual reasons to think it is the latter. Later in this chapter I discuss the evolution of the droits d’auteur tradition in France. Here, at the supposed heart of the natural rights tradition, we find thinkers driven inexorably to consider the question of limits. How far does the supposed natural right extend—in time, in space, in subject matter? It is at that moment that the utilitarian focus and the fear of monopoly represented by Jefferson and Madison—and, for that matter, Locke and Condorcet—become so important. \\ Professor Mossoff is correct to criticize the focus on the word “privilege,” and also correct that the ideas of natural right and the labor theory of value always color attitudes toward intellectual property claims. But it would be an equal and opposite mistake to ignore two points. First, intellectual property rights are profoundly different from physical property rights over land in ways that should definitively shape policy choices. Second, partly because of those differences, and because of the influence of free-trade Scottish Enlightenment thought on the American Revolution in particular, there was a powerful antimonopolist and free-trade sentiment behind the copyright and patent clause. Simply read the clause. Congress is given the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Does this really read like the work of a group of believers in natural right? On the contrary, it reads like a limited grant of power to achieve a particular utilitarian goal. That sentiment—nicely encapsulated in but by no means limited to the words of Jefferson—is still a good starting place for an understanding of intellectual property.】 historians of intellectual property have agreed.【45 See, e.g., Ochoa and Rose, “Anti-Monopoly Origins,” and Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Buffalo, N.Y.: W. S. Hein, 2002). Ochoa, Rose, and Walterscheid stress the antimonopolist concerns that animated some of those who were most active in the debates about intellectual property. They also point out the influence of the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, which attacked monopolies in general, while making an exception for periods of legal exclusivity for a limited time granted over “sole Working or Making of any Manner of new Manufacture within this Realm, to the first true Inventor or Inventors of such Manufactures which others at the time of the Making of such Letters Patents Grants did not use, so they be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by Raising of the Prices of Commodities at home, or Hurt by Trade, or generally inconvenient.”】 Jefferson himself had believed that the Constitution should have definite limits on both the term and the scope of intellectual property rights.【46 For example, in a letter to Madison commenting on the draft of the Constitution: “I like it, as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further. For instance, the following alterations and additions would have pleased me: . . . Article 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding . . . years, but for no longer term, and no other purpose.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August 28, 1789), in Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 7, 450–451.】 James Madison stressed the costs of any intellectual property right and the need to limit its term and to allow the government to end the monopoly by compulsory purchase if necessary.【47 “Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases—the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence and encouragement may be given. The limitation is particularly proper in the case of inventions, because they grow so much out of preceding ones that there is the less merit in the authors; and because, for the same reason, the discovery might be expected in a short time from other hands. . . . Monopolies have been granted in other Countries, and by some of the States in this, on another principle, that of supporting some useful undertaking, until experience and success should render the monopoly unnecessary, and lead to a salutary competition . . . But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the monopoly itself in its original operation, may produce more evil than good. In all cases of monopoly, not excepting those in favor of authors and inventors, it would be well to reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a specified and reasonable sum. . . . Perpetual monopolies of every sort are forbidden not only by the Genius of free Governments, but by the imperfection of human foresight.” James Madison, “Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments” (1819), in “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” Harper’s Magazine, ed. Galliard Hunt, 128 (1914), 489–490; also in “Madison’s ‘Detatched Memoranda,’ ” ed. Elizabeth Fleet, William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 3 no. 4 (1946): 551–552, available at ┥http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm.】┝┤http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm.}~├ Adam Smith expressed similar views. Monopolies that carry on long after they were needed to encourage some socially beneficial activity, he said, tax every other citizen “very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on.”【48 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pt. 3, Of the Expenses of Public Works and Public Institutions, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1880), 2:339: “When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on.”】 +| These words from Jefferson and Macaulay encapsulate an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century free-trade skepticism about intellectual property, a skepticism that is widely, but not universally, believed to have played an important role in shaping the history of intellectual property in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Certainly the U.S. Supreme Court has offered support for that position,【43 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1966).】 and, with one significant recent exception,【44 Adam Mossoff, “Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? Reevaluating the Patent ‘Privilege’ in Historical Context,” Cornell Law Review 92 (2007): 953–1012. In a thoughtful, carefully reasoned, and provocative article, Professor Mossoff argues that Jefferson’s views have been misused by the courts and legal historians, and that if we understand the use of the word “privilege” in historical context, we see that the “patent privilege” was influenced by a philosophy of natural rights as well as the antimonopolist utilitarianism described here. I both agree and disagree.┙ Professor Mossoff’s central point—that the word “privilege” was not understood by eighteenth-century audiences as the antonym of “right”—is surely correct. To lay great stress on the linguistic point that the patent right is “merely” a “privilege” is to rest one’s argument on a weak reed. But this is not the only argument. One could also believe that intellectual property rights have vital conceptual and practical differences with property rights over tangible objects or land, that the framers of the Constitution who were most involved in the intellectual property clause were deeply opposed to the confusion involved in conflating the two, and that they looked upon this confusion particularly harshly because of an intense concern about state monopolies. One can still disagree with this assessment, of course; one can interpret Madison’s words this way or that, or interpret subsequent patent decisions as deep statements of principle or commonplace rhetorical flourishes. Still it seems to me a much stronger argument than the one based on the privilege–right distinction. I am not sure Professor Mossoff would disagree. \\ Professor Mossoff is also correct to point out that a “legal privilege” did sometimes mean to an eighteenth-century reader something that the state was duty-bound to grant. There was, in fact, a wide range of sources from which an eighteenth-century lawyer could derive a state obligation to grant a privilege. Eighteenth-century legal talk was a normative bouillabaisse—a rich stew of natural right, common law, utility, and progress—often thrown together without regard to their differences. Some lawyers and judges thought the common law embodied natural rights, others that it represented the dictates of “progress” and “utility,” and others, more confusingly still, seemed to adopt all of those views at once. \\ Nevertheless, I would agree that some eighteenth-century writers saw claims of common-law right beneath the assertion of some “privileges” and that a smaller number of those assumed common-law right and natural right to be equivalent, and thus saw a strong state obligation to grant a particular privilege based on natural right, wherever that privilege had been recognized by English or U.S. common law. But here is where I part company with Professor Mossoff. \\ First, I do not believe that the most important architects of the intellectual property clause shared that view when it came to patents and copyrights. Jefferson, of course, was not one of those who believed the state was so bound. “Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body” (Letter to McPherson, 334, emphasis added). More importantly, Jefferson’s thinking about patents was infused by a deeply utilitarian, antimonopolist tinge. So, I would argue, was Madison’s. \\ The quotations from Madison which I give later show clearly, to me at least, that Madison shared Jefferson’s deeply utilitarian attitude toward patent and copyright law. I think there is very good reason to believe that this attitude was dominant among the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers whose writings were so influential to the framers. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the American Revolution was violently against the world of monopoly and corruption that was the supposed target of the English Statute of Monopolies (itself hardly a natural rights document). Yes, those thinkers might fall back into talking about how hard an inventor had worked or construing a patent expansively. Yes, they might think that within the boundaries of settled law, it would be unjust to deny one inventor a patent when the general scheme of patent law had already been laid down. But that did not and does not negate the antimonopolist and, for that matter, utilitarian roots of the Constitution’s intellectual property clause. \\ Second, while I agree that there were strands of natural right thinking and a labor theory of value in the U.S. intellectual property system, and that they continue to this day—indeed, these were the very views that the Feist decision discussed in Chapter 9 repudiated, as late as 1991—I think it is easy to make too much of that fact. Is this signal or noise? There are conceptual reasons to think it is the latter. Later in this chapter I discuss the evolution of the droits d’auteur tradition in France. Here, at the supposed heart of the natural rights tradition, we find thinkers driven inexorably to consider the question of limits. How far does the supposed natural right extend—in time, in space, in subject matter? It is at that moment that the utilitarian focus and the fear of monopoly represented by Jefferson and Madison—and, for that matter, Locke and Condorcet—become so important. \\ Professor Mossoff is correct to criticize the focus on the word “privilege,” and also correct that the ideas of natural right and the labor theory of value always color attitudes toward intellectual property claims. But it would be an equal and opposite mistake to ignore two points. First, intellectual property rights are profoundly different from physical property rights over land in ways that should definitively shape policy choices. Second, partly because of those differences, and because of the influence of free-trade Scottish Enlightenment thought on the American Revolution in particular, there was a powerful antimonopolist and free-trade sentiment behind the copyright and patent clause. Simply read the clause. Congress is given the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Does this really read like the work of a group of believers in natural right? On the contrary, it reads like a limited grant of power to achieve a particular utilitarian goal. That sentiment—nicely encapsulated in but by no means limited to the words of Jefferson—is still a good starting place for an understanding of intellectual property.】 historians of intellectual property have agreed.【45 See, e.g., Ochoa and Rose, “Anti-Monopoly Origins,” and Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Buffalo, N.Y.: W. S. Hein, 2002). Ochoa, Rose, and Walterscheid stress the antimonopolist concerns that animated some of those who were most active in the debates about intellectual property. They also point out the influence of the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, which attacked monopolies in general, while making an exception for periods of legal exclusivity for a limited time granted over “sole Working or Making of any Manner of new Manufacture within this Realm, to the first true Inventor or Inventors of such Manufactures which others at the time of the Making of such Letters Patents Grants did not use, so they be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by Raising of the Prices of Commodities at home, or Hurt by Trade, or generally inconvenient.”】 Jefferson himself had believed that the Constitution should have definite limits on both the term and the scope of intellectual property rights.【46 For example, in a letter to Madison commenting on the draft of the Constitution: “I like it, as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further. For instance, the following alterations and additions would have pleased me: . . . Article 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding . . . years, but for no longer term, and no other purpose.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August 28, 1789), in Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 7, 450–451.】 James Madison stressed the costs of any intellectual property right and the need to limit its term and to allow the government to end the monopoly by compulsory purchase if necessary.【47 “Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases—the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence and encouragement may be given. The limitation is particularly proper in the case of inventions, because they grow so much out of preceding ones that there is the less merit in the authors; and because, for the same reason, the discovery might be expected in a short time from other hands. . . . Monopolies have been granted in other Countries, and by some of the States in this, on another principle, that of supporting some useful undertaking, until experience and success should render the monopoly unnecessary, and lead to a salutary competition . . . But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the monopoly itself in its original operation, may produce more evil than good. In all cases of monopoly, not excepting those in favor of authors and inventors, it would be well to reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a specified and reasonable sum. . . . Perpetual monopolies of every sort are forbidden not only by the Genius of free Governments, but by the imperfection of human foresight.” James Madison, “Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments” (1819), in “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” Harper’s Magazine, ed. Galliard Hunt, 128 (1914), 489–490; also in “Madison’s ‘Detatched Memoranda,’ ” ed. Elizabeth Fleet, William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 3 no. 4 (1946): 551–552, available at ┥http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm┝┤http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm├.】 Adam Smith expressed similar views. Monopolies that carry on long after they were needed to encourage some socially beneficial activity, he said, tax every other citizen “very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on.”【48 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pt. 3, Of the Expenses of Public Works and Public Institutions, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1880), 2:339: “When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on.”】 [114] para .part: body @@ -13740,7 +13740,7 @@ .is_of_type: para .has: links .anchor_tag: note_47 -| ┥⑆^┨47.┣^┝┤¤chapter_2.fnSuffix#noteref_47├ “Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases—the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence and encouragement may be given. The limitation is particularly proper in the case of inventions, because they grow so much out of preceding ones that there is the less merit in the authors; and because, for the same reason, the discovery might be expected in a short time from other hands. . . . Monopolies have been granted in other Countries, and by some of the States in this, on another principle, that of supporting some useful undertaking, until experience and success should render the monopoly unnecessary, and lead to a salutary competition . . . But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the monopoly itself in its original operation, may produce more evil than good. In all cases of monopoly, not excepting those in favor of authors and inventors, it would be well to reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a specified and reasonable sum. . . . Perpetual monopolies of every sort are forbidden not only by the Genius of free Governments, but by the imperfection of human foresight.” James Madison, “Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments” (1819), in “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” Harper’s Magazine, ed. Galliard Hunt, 128 (1914), 489–490; also in “Madison’s ‘Detatched Memoranda,’ ” ed. Elizabeth Fleet, William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 3 no. 4 (1946): 551–552, available at ┥http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm. +| ┥⑆^┨47.┣^┝┤¤chapter_2.fnSuffix#noteref_47├ “Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases—the authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence and encouragement may be given. The limitation is particularly proper in the case of inventions, because they grow so much out of preceding ones that there is the less merit in the authors; and because, for the same reason, the discovery might be expected in a short time from other hands. . . . Monopolies have been granted in other Countries, and by some of the States in this, on another principle, that of supporting some useful undertaking, until experience and success should render the monopoly unnecessary, and lead to a salutary competition . . . But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the monopoly itself in its original operation, may produce more evil than good. In all cases of monopoly, not excepting those in favor of authors and inventors, it would be well to reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a specified and reasonable sum. . . . Perpetual monopolies of every sort are forbidden not only by the Genius of free Governments, but by the imperfection of human foresight.” James Madison, “Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments” (1819), in “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” Harper’s Magazine, ed. Galliard Hunt, 128 (1914), 489–490; also in “Madison’s ‘Detatched Memoranda,’ ” ed. Elizabeth Fleet, William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 3 no. 4 (1946): 551–552, available at ┥http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm┝┤http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm├. [0] endnote .part: backmatter |
